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THE UNIFORM TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT AND THE
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY
ROBERT W. HALLGRING*

Professor Hallgring presents a detailed analysis of the proposed
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act's impact on the fiduciary duties of
loyalty, care, and non-delegation of discretionarypowers. He emphasizes serious downgrading of fiduciary responsibility implicit in
several provisions of the proposed act, particularly in the modern
context of the large corporate fiduciary. Professor Hallgring concludes that, although many provisions of the act have merit, it does
not sufficiently protect the beneficiary as presently drafted. He suggests, however, that amendments strengthening the standards of
fiduciary responsibility could be incorporatedinto the act without
destroying the benefits sought by its framers.
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, proposed in 1964 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was
recently reviewed in these pages by Charles Horowitz, Esq., Chairman
of the Committee responsible for its drafting.'
The Act has been recommended by its sponsors under the everpopular rubric of modernization.2 Its central conception, attributed
to a proposal by Professor William Fratcher,3 involves the wholesale
removal of specific inhibitions on trustees' powers, and the substitution
of the "prudent man" rule4 as a virtually exclusive principle' for the
regulation of trustees' conduct. By this means, the Act's proponents
hope to free the law of trusts from the encumbrance of antiquity, and
to facilitate its function as an efficient device for the management of
property.0
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington
'Horowitz, Uniform Trustees Powers Act, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1966).
'Horowitz, supra note 1, at 1-4; UNIFoRM TRUSTES' PowERs AcT, Prefatory Note
(Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs of Uniform State Law, 1964).

The UNIFORm TRUSTEES'

POWERS AcT will hereinafter be cited as Act.
'Horowitz, supra note 1, at 7; Act, Prefatory Note; See Fratcher, Trustees'
Powers Legislatioms, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 627 (1962).
"Horowitz, supra note 1, at 4-6; Act § 3(a).
'The Act additionally requires a trustee to act "with due regard to his obligation
as a fiduciary ... " § 3(b). It will be suggested, however, that certain powers
conferred by the Act are inherently violative of accepted principles of fiduciary
responsibility.
See Horowitz, stpranote 2, at 1-4; Fratcher, supranote 3, at 658.
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The announced goals of the Act are laudable, and many of its detailed provisions have merit.' The Act, however, may not be viewed
piecemeal, but must be appraised as an integrated legislative scheme.'
To be acceptable, its purposes must be accomplished without substantial countervailing disadvantage.
It is suggested that the Act goes far beyond removing needless encumbrances on efficient management; that it severely impairs basic
restraints proved necessary by experience for preservation of those
attitudes of confidence essential to proper functioning of the trust
device-specifically, those restraints derived from the fiduciary duties
of loyalty, of care (or skill), and the duty not to delegate discretionary
powers.
The Act will be discussed with respect to its effect on each of these
basic principles of fiduciary responsibility.
I. THE FIDucIARY CONCEPT AND THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
"Fiduciary" relationships are those in which a person is entitled to
repose confidence in another who has undertaken to act in his interest.'
They may be said to vary in "intensity," depending on the rigor with
which the obligations of confidence are enforced. 10 In modern law
the trust is the most familiar example and perhaps the most "intensive"
of such relationships."
Foremost among the standards of conduct imposed upon fiduciaries
' Certain traditional limitations on trustees' powers reflect merely a distrust
of trustees' managerial competence, and a conservative desire to preserve the trust
property for the remainderman at the expense of the immediate beneficiary. Examples are, specific inhibitions on trustees' investment powers, including the powers
to sell, lease or mortgage, and on their powers to vote corporate stock or to settle
claims. Such limitations can be safely consigned to the governance of the "prudent
man" rule. See Act §§3(c) (5), (7)-(10), (12)-(15), and (19). In this limited context, the rule is consonant with the present-day tendency to favor immediate beneficiaries and the recognition that, in view of a probably long-term inflationary trend,
even deferred beneficiaries are not well served by excessive conservatism in investment
or by administrative rigidity.
' This is true not only because certain criticisms will relate to basic and inseverable features of the proposed Act, but also because any substantial legislative
modification of a uniform act will undermine its basic function of promoting
uniformity.
See Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAmm. L. J. 69; Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle,37 CALIF. L. Ry. 539, 540 (1949).
" The "intensity" of a fiduciary relationship varies with the degree of independent
action entrusted to the fiduciary. Thus, a trustee who holds title to the trust property
and has more-or-less complete practical control and power of disposition, often for long
periods, is more rigorously bound by fiduciary standards of conduct than an agent,
whose authority is generally more limited in scope and duration. Scott, supra note 9,
at 541; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 2, comment b (1959). See Sealy, supra
note 9, where a more elaborate classification of fiduciary relationships is attempted.
' See references cited in note 10 supra. Other obvious examples are the relationships of executor to legatee, guardian to ward, director to corporation,
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is the duty of loyalty. 12 The duty of loyalty is simply the obligation
of a fiduciary to act always in the interest of the beneficiary, and never
in his own interest, in any matter pertaining to the object of the relationship. 3
A. Some Historical Antecedents
The roots of the obligation are ethical, 4 and long antedate the
Common Law.' Human experience revealed at an early date that,
like other ethical principles, obligations of loyalty are not reliably
self-enforcing. For this reason, it has been necessary to develop rules
of conduct (both ethical and legal), and appropriate sanctions, to
enforce the underlying moral obligations.
The first lesson of experience is that it is not enough merely to
insist that a fiduciary subordinate his own interest to that of the
beneficiary. Given human frailty, we cannot expect the fiduciary to
put his personal advantage in second place. That "no man can serve
two masters"'" is a commonplace, and the difficulty is compounded
where one of the masters is his own self-interest.
From this observation it follows that undivided and disinterested
devotion by one person to the interest of another will be assured only
where the possibility of conflicting interest is excluded. Since the
motives underlying human conduct can rarely be established with
certainty, the exclusion of conflicting interests will be assured only
when all possibilities of personal profit have been eliminated, either
agent to principal, and partners to each other. See Scott, supra note 9, at 541;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §2, comment b (1959).
The preeminence of the trust as an example of the fiduciary relationship is
suggested by the tendency of courts and writers, especially in England, to apply

the word "trust" loosely to a wide variety of relationships when viewed in their
fiduciary aspect See Sealy, supra note 9, at 70-71. See, e.g., "The guardians were
but trustees" (as to the choice of a school for their ward). Duke of Beaufort v.
Barty, I P. Wms. 703, 704-05; "an heir has been so far regarded as a trustee for
creditors of the ancestor, that he cannot hold an incumbrance as against them for
more than he gave for it." LEWIN, TRUSTS 205 (15th ed. 1950).
"BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2d ed. 1960) (hereinafter cited as
BOGERT) ; Scorr, TRUSTS § 170 (2d ed. 1956) (hereinafter cited as SCOTT).
'z See sources cited note 12 supra.
SMichoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503 (1846); J. C. Penney Co. v. Schulte

Real Estate Co., 292 Mass. 42, 44, 197 N.E. 458, 459 (1935); Nebraska Power Co.
v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 76-77, 139 N.W. 839, 842 (1913) ; Stone, The Public Influence
of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8(1934).
Josiah Royce, in THE PHiLOSOPHY OF LOYALTY (1930), proposed that all ethical
norms could be derived from the single and basic notion of "loyalty" (albeit
somewhat broadly defined). While his success may well be doubted, the plausibility of his argument attests the prime importance of loyalty as an ethical norm.
For a professional trustee's comment on the ethical foundation of the duty of
loyalty, see Stephenson, Idealism in Trust Business, 103 TRUST & ESTATES 322 (1964).
See notes 17 to 22 infra, and accompanying text
" Matthew 6:24.
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by prohibiting altogether those kinds of conduct which could result in
such profit to the fiduciary, or by providing that any profit realized
in the administration of the fiduciary relationship shall inure to the
beneficiary.
These practical corollaries of the ethical obligation of loyalty are
not the product of misanthropic speculation. They are based on a
wealth of experience by no means limited temporally or geographically
to the milieu of the common law. Fiduciary miscreancy is coeval with
fiduciary responsibility, and historically the two have been inseparable
-so much so that recognition of the moral or legal duty of loyalty
must often be inferred principally from the rules of conduct prescribed
for its enforcement.
In pentateuchal times, goods "lost" or "stolen" while in the possession of a bailee, were presumed to have been embezzled by the bailee,
and the presumption could be rebutted only by a formal and ceremonial oath-taking." In the Parable of the Unjust Steward,' 8 the
duty of loyalty and its breach are treated with classic irony, leaving
a strong impression that the kind of conduct portrayed was not un9
common.'
Rules for avoiding conflicts of interest figured markedly in Roman
Law. Only under severe restrictions could a guardian buy property
from his ward.2" Nor could a tutor enter into any transaction with
21
his pupil which might result in profit to himself or his family.
Similarly, a provincial magistrate could buy nothing but necessaries
within his province.22
In the Canon Law, clerics in orders were altogether forbidden to
engage in trade, largely because of a fear that their position would
tempt them to press improper bargains.23
The origins of the rules governing fiduciary conduct in modern
Anglo-American law are obscure, largely due to the lack of early Chan'Exodus 22:6-9. Cf. 1 Kings 8:31-32. The oath taking is suggestive of the
procedure of compurgation formerly available to a defendant in certain actions at
common law.
S Luke 16:1-13. In this parable a steward, about to be discharged, compromised all his masters' debts to ingratiate himself with the debtors. For this,
he was praised for his "wisdom."
" For a tongue-in-cheek legal analysis of this parable, see Scott, supra note
9, at 539-541.
1 DIGEST 18.1.34.7.
-1DIGEST 26.8.5; DIGEST 18.1.46; CODE 4.385.
1 DIGEST 49.16.9.
' VINTER, A

TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

3 (1932). This policy is perhaps reflected in the English conciliar decree cited
in note 33 infra.
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cery reports.2 4 However, there is nothing obscure about the experience that gave rise to them.
The dishonest executor25 was a subject of much handwringing by
the medieval English moralist. In 1303, Robert Mannyng of Brunne,
in the penitential manual Handlyng Synne, devoting over 300 lines to
the subject,2 laments:
Of all6 fals khat beryn name,
Fals executours are maste to blame.
]e pope of Pe courte of Rome,
A3ens hem 3yfJp he harde dome
And curseP hem yn cherchys here
7
Foure tymes yn P e ere.1
An eminent preacher of the same period describes the plight of the
dying man surrounded by his friends and executors waiting with sticky
fingers ("manibus viscosis") to carry off his worldly goods.2"
English ecclesiastical authorities were not insensitive to the problems
of fiduciary disloyalty. In 1240, a synodal statute of the diocese of
Worcester 29 recited that "the administration of wills by executors...
achieves proper results less often than is fitting, sometimes because
of the fraud of the executors and sometimes through their negligence... . ,30 By way of remedy, the statute regulated executors' com-

As to the sparseness and unreliability of early Chancery reports, see MAITLAND,
7-8 (1909); PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HIsTORY OF THE COMMON
Veeder, The English Reports, 1292-1865, 15 HARv. L. REV.
109 (1901). The legal principles governing the modern trust and its predecessor,
the use, were of course almost entirely the product of Chancery.
'The use did not receive judicial protection until early in the 15th century.
Prior to that time, the most significant fiduciary relationship was probably that
of the executor, whose obligations were enforced by the ecclesiastical courts. With
respect to the honesty of executors, see SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL. ENGLAND
219 (1963).
-' ROBmRT MANNVNG OF BRUNNE, HANDLYNG
SYNNE (1303) lines 6173-514 (Furnival ed. 1901).
" Id. at lines 6257-62.
Mannyng buttresses his complaint with morality tales of executors who in one
case embezzled a legacy for masses, and in another defrauded the decedent's son
of his share of the estate. He offers the advice that relatives are the worst
executors of all, and that the only way (as well as the most praiseworthy) to
insure the intended devolution of one's property is to give it away during life.
'JOHN DE BROMYARD, SuanrI PlDICANTIUM, tit. Mors, quoted in OwsT PREACHING IN IEDIEVAL ENGLAND 342 and n.2 (1926).
1 WILKINS, CONClLIA AfAGNAE BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE, A SYN ODO VEROLAMIENSI A.D. CCCCXLVI AD LoNDINIENsi A.D. MDCCXVII 674 (1937).
"vero testamentorum executio per executores, seu commissarios rarms quam
deceret, debitum fortitur effectum, turn per fraudem executorum, turn per negligentiam eorundum...."
LECTURES ON EOUIT
LAW 620-22 (1930);
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pensation,3 1 provided for the removal of careless or disloyal executors,
and expressly forbade executors to purchasegoods directly or indirectly
from the decedent's estate.2 In 1261 a provincial constitution of a
Council of Lambeth 3 required executors to submit inventories to the
ordinary before entering upon administration, and to render accounts
whenever requested by the ordinary. The same statute forbade clerics
to act as executors, except upon the express and special mandate of
diocesan authorities.
That fiduciary misfeasance was not limited to executors is shown by
Chapters four and five of Magna Charta (1215), which restrain
guardians of infants from various abuses of their fiduciary position.
Notwithstanding the obscurity of the early development of the law
of trusts, it seems clear that men of affairs were often unwilling to
rely too heavily on the honesty of trustees. It was, for example,
a common practice in establishing a feoffment to uses, to enfeoff
large numbers of persons jointly, on the theory that there is safety
in numbers.34 Moreover, the most vigorous impetus to the growth of
Chancery jurisdiction was an ever-present demand for the judicial
35
enforcement of uses.
About a century before the first clear, reported statement of the
modern rules of fiduciary loyalty, the Duke of Norfolk's Case,3" one of
the landmark cases of the law of property, strikingly exhibited the
persistence of fiduciary inconstancyY3 The dispute in that case arose
after two successive trustees of a large estate, in clear breach of
trust, made conveyances in an attempt to extinguish contingent remainders.
' The statute provides that only modest fees be taken where the estate is substantial,
and3 that the estates of poor persons be administered without compensation.
"Inhibemus etiam executoribus antedictis, ne de bonis defuncti recipiant aliquid,
titulo emptionis, vel donationis per se, vel per alios, nisi fortassis aliquid eis fuerit
legatum a dicto defuncto, dum adhuc viveret, aut donatum."
This is probably among the earliest expressions in English law of the rule
against self-dealing by fiduciaries.
' 1 WILKINS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 754, sub. tit. De testainentis, et corim
executoribus. This constitution is of broader historical interest in that it contains provisions threatening excommunication against any secular authority laying
claim to probate jurisdiction. Elsewhere in the same constitution, sub. lit. De bonis
laicorum ab intestato decedentium, even more pointed strictures are directed against
interference by feudal lords with the administration of estates of such of their
tenants as may die intestate.
PLUCKN m', op. cit. supranote 24, at 517.
SId. at 617-18. See also MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 24, at 6-11. In 1402 a peti-

tion was presented to Commons praying some remedy against "disloyal feoffes" who
grant away the lands of which they were enfeoffed to uses. 4 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 417 (1924).
S3
Ch. Cas. of
1, 26the(Ch.
Students
law1682).
of future interests may detect overtones of fiduciary
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B. Policies Underlying the Existing Rule

In the light of the longstanding experience with fiduciary disloyalty
suggested in the preceding section, it is not surprising that the modern
rules of law governing fiduciary loyalty reflect a strong concern for
eliminating every possible temptation of self-interest." In continuing
pursuit of this objective, the courts are not content merely to declare
the basic axiom that a trustee must act solely in the interest of the
beneficiary.3 9 They have been insistent that the trustee shall not put
himself in a position where his interest could possibly conflict with
that of a beneficiary."
Perhaps the most common example of disloyal conduct is the purchase of trust property by the trustee.4 It is clear that such a
purchase is voidable.42 Any profit on subsequent sale of the property
will inure to the trust.
It is as unnecessary for the beneficiary to
show that the trustee's motives were improper as it is unavailing for
the trustee to demonstrate, however conclusively, that they were
proper. 4 It is no defense for the trustee to show that he acted in
good faith in purchasing the goods,4 5 or for the purpose of benefiting
or protecting the trust estate,40 or that the price was fair,47 or even
that he purchased it at public auction on a competitive bid.4
disloyalty in another landmark case, Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590 (K.B. 1620),
though a trust, eo nomine, was not involved.
'The
existing rules of fiduciary loyalty are most often traced to Fox v.
Macreth, Bro. C.C. 400 (1788), where a trustee bought trust property with the
consent of the beneficiary, but at an inadequate price and without full disclosure.
It was held that the beneficiary was accountable for a profit realized on the
sale. Campbell v. Walker, 5 Ves. 678, 13 Ves. 601 (1800, 1807), where it was held
that a purchase of trust property by a trustee at public auction could be set aside
even if the price was fair, established that the possibility of conflicting interest
was sufficient to discredit a transaction, without proof of actual disloyalty.
"As expressed in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 170 (1) (1959): "The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiary."
"'Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 119 (1914); It re Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y.
376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943) ; Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co. 121 N.J. Eq. 460, 191 Atl.
304 (Ch. 1937); 2 SCOTT § 170. See Hoover, Basic Principles Underlying Dity of
Loyalty, 5 CLEV.-MIAR. L. REV. 7 (1956), in which many basic authorities defining and
aplying the fiduciary duty of loyalty are collected.
11BOGERT § 543 (A); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 170 and comments b
through f; 2 ScOTT §§ 170, 170.1.
" BOGERT § 543 (A), at 496-97; 2 SCOTT § 1702.
'Locke v. Old Colony Trust Co., 289 Mass. 245, 193 N.E. 892 (1935); Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. Jr. 740 (1798) ; BOGERT § 543 (A), at 497; 2 ScoTT § 170.2.
"Hoover, supra note 40, at 14-18.
' Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 261 (N.Y. 1816) ; Harrison v. Manson,
95 Va. 593,29 S.E. 420 (1898).
Bennett v. Weber, 323 Ill.
283, 154 N.E. 105 (1926).
"BOGERT § 543(A), at 487.
' In such case the trustee's personal interest in securing the property as cheaply

as possible may tempt him to discourage bids and otherwise fail to exert his
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The trustee may justify a self-dealing transaction only by showing
(1) that the beneficiaries consented, (2) that their consent was given
after full disclosure of all facts material to the transaction, and of the
beneficiary's legal rights in the light of those facts, and (3) that the
transaction was fair and reasonable. 9 The "uncompromising rigidity" 0 of the rule requiring undivided loyalty is not an arid formalism. 5 '
The courts have consistently held that this inflexibility is essential to
its effective operation. 2
In refusing to make ready exceptions to the rule, the courts have
recognized three principal considerations.5 3 I will discuss these briefly,
in the belief that the reasons which gave rise to the present state of
the law go far to commend its retention. 4
First, the courts have acknowledged that it is difficult, if not impossible for a person to act impartially in a matter in which he has
an interest. Lord Loughborough said, in Wkichcote v. Lawrence:r
"Where a trustee has a prospect of advantage to himself, it is a great
temptation to him to be negligent." A similar statement may be found
in Thorp v. McCullum:56 "Between two conflicting interests, it is
easy to foresee, and all experience has shown, whose interests will
be neglected and sacrificed."
best efforts to secure a good auction. Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. Jr. 740
(1798) ; 2 ScoTT § 170.4.
2 Scorr §§ 170.1, 216.3.
WI shall not be the first to depart from tradition by failing to quote Judge
Cardozo's classic, if florid, statement of the principle of fiduciary loyalty in
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928):
Many forms of conduct permissable in a workaday world for those acting at arm s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level
higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not be consciously lowered by this
court.
See In re Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943). Hoover, supra note
40, at 23-25.
'Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. Jr. 740 (1798); Conway v. Green's Adm'r,
1 Har. & J. (Md.) 151, 152 (1801); In re Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E2d
909 (1943); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928); Hoover,
supra note 40, at 14-18.
SThe "three" arguments to be stated are to a large degree interdependent.
The division is for purposes of convenient presentation.
' At the close of this section it will be suggested that, in the light of contemporary trust practice, the reasons underlying the rules of loyalty are as pertinent as ever.
3 Ves. Jr. 740, 750, 752 (1798).
56 Ill. 614 (1844).
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It was said in Rowland v. Kable: 7
One who is entrusted with the business of another cannot be allowed
to make that business an object of interest to himself... The two positions impose different obligations, and this union would at once raise a
conflict between interest and duty; and, constituted as humanity is, in the
majority of cases duty would be overborne in the struggle.
Just as no one may be a judge in his own cause, 5" so a trustee can not
be expected to utilize his best, most objective and disinterested judgment in situations where that judgment may run counter to his own
interest. This observation, as earlier suggested,59 seems to be something of a constant in human affairs. It is not confined to the law of
trusts, but has its analogies in the law of agency ° and of public
officers. 0 '
It should be noted that the stricture against conflicting interest
does not rest upon an imputation of dishonesty.62 That the most conscientious and judicious of men cannot be unmoved by the obtrusion
of his own interest has long been recognized.6" It should, if anything,
be more obvious in our own time in view of our increasing understanding of the importance of subconscious factors in human motivation. However upright the trustee, if the intrusion of personal ad' 174 Va. 343, 366-67, 6 S.E2d 633, 642 (1940). See also McLellan's Estate v. McLellan, 8 Cal. 2d 49, 54, 63 P2d 1120 (1936).
' That no one may be a judge in his own cause was regarded by Lord Coke,
in Bonhan's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 118a (C.P. 1610), as a logically necessary position,
which he said could not be modified by an act of Parliament. And in City of
London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-88 (K.B. 1701), Lord Holt said: "if an act of
Parliament should ordain that the same person should be a party and a judge,
or which is the same thing, judge in his own cause, it would be a void act of
parliament ... [Parliament] can do no wrong, though it may do several things
that look pretty odd." However doubtful these decisions may be as expressions of
English constitutional law (see Lee v. Bude & Torrington Railway Co., L.R. 6
C.P. 576, 582 (1871)), they testify to the strength of the inhibition against conflicts of
interest in the common law system.
' See text accompanying notes 14 to 37 supra.
' "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to
act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENcy § 387 (1958). The rules prohibiting self-dealing
by agents closely parallel those governing the conduct of trustees. See id. §
388-91, 394.
"A public officer is forbidden to acquire any interest potentially adverse to
that of the state. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1909); Capital Gas
Co. v. Young, 109 Cal. 140, 41 Pac. 869 (1895); Goodyear v. Brown, 155 Pa.
514, 26 Atl. 665 (1893) ; Okanogan Power & Irrig. Co. v. Quackenbush, 107 Wash.
651, 182 Pac. 618 (1919). See 43 Air. JuRa. Public Officers § 266 (1942).
Also, in addition to any pertinent constitutional restraints, it is established at
common law that a person may not simultaneously hold two public offices whose
duties are "incompatible." See Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 166 A2d 360 (1960).
" See BOGERT § 543, at 479; § 543 (A), at 482-85.
C Rules of court requiring disqualification of judges for bias are pertinent.
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vantage does not tip the scales of judgment against the interest of
his beneficiary (perhaps without his conscious recognition), it will,
by causing him to "lean over backwards" or in some still more subtle
way, distort his objectivity. In any case, the beneficiary is deprived
of that disinterested and impartial judgment to which he is entitled. 4
The man of intelligent and refined sensitivity will be the first to recognize this, and to give wide berth to situations in which his freedom of
judgment will be encumbered by a prospect of personal advantage.
Secondly, the courts have realized that fiduciary relationships lend
themselves to exploitation. 5 This is especially true in the case of
the trust, in which the fiduciary aspect is peculiarly "intense.""0 The
trustee, by reason of his more-or-less complete control and day-to-day
management of the trust property, often for long periods, has a large
advantage over the beneficiary with respect to any matter in which
their interests conflict. Normally, the trustee's position gives him
superior knowledge of all the facts and circumstances relating to the
trust property and its administration. Furthermore, the main purpose
of his appointment is often to relieve the beneficiary of the cares of
management, and to confer upon him the benefit of the trustee's
superior skill and judgment. For these reasons, the success of the
trust relationship will depend on the ability of the beneficiary to
trust the trustee. The morals of the market place will not suffice. 7
If the beneficiary must deal with the trustee at arm's length, look
behind his representations, and supervise his conduct, the utility of
the trust is greatly impaired. The only way to insure that the beneficiary can sleep at night in free and easy reliance on the loyalty of
the trustee is to remove all serious temptations to disloyalty.
Finally, the courts have made much of the fact that disloyal conduct
is hard to detect.0 Lord Loughborough, quoting Lord Hardwicke,
said, in Whichcote v. Lawrence: 9
'Parsons v. Wysor, 180 Va. 84, 21 S.E.2d 753 (1942); In re Trusteeship of
Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N.E.2d 755 (1941) ; Pyle v. Pyle, 122 N.Y. Supp. 256, 259
(App. Div.), aff'd, 199 N.Y. 538, 92 N.E. 1099 (1910).

'Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928); Hoover,
supra note 40, at 10-11.
See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"'

Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
Chancellor Kent, at 4 COMAENTARIES 503 (9th ed.) states that the rule is founded
upon "the presumption of the existence of fraud, inaccessible to the eye of the court."
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carrow, 14 Del. Ch. 290, 294, 125 Atl. 350, 351 (1924),
speaks of "the difficulty of unraveling fraud in these transactions." Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co, 103 N.Y. 58, 73-74, 8 N.E. 355 (1886), tells us that "real motives often elude the most searching inquiry." See other cases cited in Hoover, supra
note 40, at 12-14.
' 3 Ves. Jr. 740, 750, 752 (1798).
'
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Where a trustee has a prospect of advantage to himself, it is a great
temptation to him to be negligent; acting in a manner, that does not
quite fix an imputation on him. His conduct may be so covered, that
it may be difficult to fix direct fraud upon him.
The facts of that case exemplify the danger. The trust was for the
benefit of the settlor's creditors. One of the six trustees bought in
certain property at auction, with the consent of a co-trustee who
was also acting as solicitor for the trust. Thereafter, he resold the
property at a profit, and the court held that quite apart from any
question as to the fairness of the original purchase price, the profit
must inure to the trust estate. It appeared that the purchasing trustee
had privately ascribed to the property a higher value than he was
required to bid. While not necessary to the holding, this latter circumstance was pointed out as evidencing a form of actual disloyalty
which must often go unnoticed.
The reasons why disloyalty will often go undetected are plain
enough. The trustee, by reason of his day-to-day management of the
trust estate, generally commands better information concerning its
affairs than the beneficiary. Even a court, inquiring into his administration at a later date, cannot expect to match the trustee's knowledge.
Furthermore, many decisions of a trustee are matters of refined judgment and discretion. On such subjects as the value of trust property,
the wisdom of the retention or reinvestment of assets, and the needs
of the beneficiaries, judgments are rarely clear-cut. A wide variety of
determinations can generally be supported by plausible argument, and
70
rationalizations made after the fact will generally be unassailable.
As to these decisions of the trustee, undivided loyalty can be guaranteed only by removing all factors which might give rise to a contrary
motivation. This, of course, will not insure that the trustee's judgments are infallible or even that they are the best of which he is
capable; but it will insure that they are not influenced by motives
adverse to the interest of the beneficiary.
C. Modifications Proposedby the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act
It is now appropriate to list and evaluate the ways in which the
proposed Uniform Trustees' Powers Act would modify existing requirements of trustee loyalty. The provisions most seriously involved
are sections 3(c) (1) permitting the retention of assets in which
"Any practitioner in the field of eminent domain will substantiate this as to questions
of value.
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the trustee has an interest, 3(c) (20) permitting the trustee to "pay"
his own compensation, and 3 (c) (24) in so far as it permits the trustee
to engage the services of associates for its assistance in the administration of the trust.7
It should be noted at the outset that section 5 (b) of the Act contains
a blanket provision requiring court approval for the exercise of a
trust power in situations where the trustee's fiduciary duty conflicts
with its individual interest, or its interest as the trustee of some other
trust. This provision, however, expressly excepts from its application
sections 3(c) (1) and 3(c) (24) referred to in the preceding paragraph. 72 As to them, the Act acknowledges the possibility of conflicting interest and yet expressly absolves from court approval transactions to which they relate. While section 3(c) (20) is not expressly
exempted from the requirement of court approval, it will later be
shown that, if the provision is to have any meaning at all, it must
be found to be impliedly exempted. 3
It is submitted that sections 3(c) (1), (20), and (24), by carving
out significant exceptions to the rule of undivided loyalty as currently
formulated by the most persuasive authorities, institute the process of
erosion against which the courts have persistently inveighed; 74 that
these sections are individually and separately objectionable; but that,
whatever might be thought of each of them in isolation, they cumula" Sections 3 (c) (4), permitting the trustee to hold an interest in assets in which it
is interested as trustee of another trust, and 3(c) (6), authorizing the trustee to deposit
trust funds in its own banking department, also create possibilities of conflicting interest.
It is believed, however, that the opportunities for self-preferment under these sections
are so inconsequential that they may be justified as facilitating economic trust administration. Section 3(c) (4), allowing the establishment of common funds, does not involve the trustee's individual interest, and permits the economies and investment flexibility derived from pooling the securities owned by small trusts in common funds. The
possibility of self-preferment under § 3(c) (6) is mitigated by the general provision of
the Act requiring the trustee to act "with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary"
(§ 3(b)), since a deposit in the trustee's banking department would presumably be
grounds for surcharge if substantially better terms were available elsewhere, or if the
deposit were for an unreasonable duration, either of which circumstance admits
of relatively objective evaluation.
As to § 3(c) (18), which permits a trustee to lend money to the trust, it would
seem that the possibilities of conflicting interest are substantial. See BOGErT
§ 543 (L). However, what little authority exists on the subject does not prohibit
such loans. See, e.g., It re Bogert's Estate, 24 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Surr. Ct. 1940);
In re Binder's Estate, 137 Ohio St. 26, 27 N.E.2d 939 (1940); Gardner's Estate,
323 Pa. 229, 185 At. 804 (1936). Therefore, §3(c) (18), so far as it relates to
the right of a trustee to lend money to the trust, does not constitute a substantial departure from existing law.
'It also excludes transactions under §§3(c) (4), 3(c) (6), and 3(c) (18) which
were discussed in the preceding footnote.
"See note 88 infra.
¢' See notes 50-52 infra, and accompanying text.
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tively represent a serious downgrading of fiduciary responsibility.
They will be taken up in sequence.
1. Section 3(c) (1). Section 3(c) (1) provides, so far as pertinent
to the present discussion, that assets received from a settlor may be
retained "until, in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the
assets should be made; . . . even though they include an asset in
which the trustee is personally interested."
This section, in its most obvious and commercially important application, would permit a corporate trustee to retain its own stock as a
trust asset. It is of course clear that a trustee may not purchase its
own stock as a trust investment, 71 and the proposed Act does not
appear to modify this rule. Similarly, the weight of judicial authority
and of scholarly opinion prohibits the retention of the trustee's stock
where it forms part of the original trust corpus. 76 The possibilities of
conflicting interest arising from such retention are apparent. A trustee
holding its own stock may have a strong interest in retaining it, since
a sale, particularly of a substantial holding, may depress the market
and lower the value of its shares.77 Our recognition of this source of
conflict may be dimmed by the persistence of a rising market in
recent years. But even in a rising market, a sale of bank shares,
especially of smaller banks whose stock has no ready market, may
compete with a desire of corporate officers or employees to sell their
own. And in times of a falling or unsettled market, a trustee will
be strongly tempted to retain its stock just when the interest of the
beneficiaries most urgently demands its sale.
In addition, quite apart from market effect, the management of a
bank may prefer to retain a block of stock in its own hands rather
than have it fall to a possibly hostile purchaser. 7 The danger of
conflict arising from a desire of corporate management to retain conBOGERT § 543 (G) ; 2 Scovr § 170.15. See UNmFORM TRUST AcT § 7.
Thruston v. Nashville & American Trust Co., 32 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Tenn.
1940); In re Durston's Will, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E2d 310 (1947); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943), affg, 264
App. Div. 429, 35 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1942), 265 App. Div. 863, 38 N.Y.S.2d 245
(1942); it re Trusteeship of Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N.E.2d 755 (1941);
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Taylor, 76 R.I. 129, 69 A.2d 234 (1949); BOGERT
§543 (G); 2 Scorr § 170.15. See Scott, Retention of Its Ouwr Shares by a
Corporate Trustee, 57 HARV. L. REv. 601 (1944). But see Director of Liquidations
v. Wood, 306 Mass. 1, 26 N.E.2d 979 (1940); In re Riker's Estate, 124 NJ.Eq.
228, 1 A.2d 213 (1938), aff'd, 125 N.J.Eq. 349-51, 5 A.2d 685 (1939).
r BOGERT § 543 (G) ; 2 Scowt § 170.15.
See People v. Canton Nat. Bank, 288 Il1. App. 418, 6 N.E.2d 220 (1937) ; BOGERT
§ 543 (G).
'

'
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trol is, of course, compounded 9 if the circumstances are such that the
7
trustee can vote its own stock.

The increasing vogue of pension and profit-sharing plans, many of
which require substantial investment of the pension fund in stock of
the employer, has opened additional possibilities of conflict. Formerly
it could be argued (if somewhat naively) that only the stockholders of
a corporation had an interest in sustaining the market for its shares,
and that this interest did not necessarily affect the "corporation"
itself, or its management." Today, not only top management, but
employees at all levels (certainly including trust personnel) through
their participation in pension plans, may have a direct and personal
interest in the value of the stock, which must necessarily affect their
judgments to sell or retain.81
It will be urged that the retention of the trustee's stock may sometimes be beneficial to the trust. But this will seldom be the case where
the trustee corporation is a large one with a ready market for its
stock. In such event, it will normally be easy enough to substitute
a comparable investment, thereby removing the trustee from the temptations of self-interest without causing any disadvantage to the trust.
The interest of the beneficiaries would affirmatively require retention
only where, due to the size of the block to be sold, or other unusual
circumstance (such as the prospect of a favorable business development not publicly known) a proper price could not be realized. In
such case it would cause no great burden to obtain the consent of
the beneficiaries after full disclosure, 82 or if they were not sui juris,
the approval of a court.8 3 Furthermore, where a very large block of
'Section 3(c)(13) of the proposed Act authorizes a trustee to vote stock.
Possibly, with respect to the trustee's own stock, such authorization would be
dependent upon court approval pursuant to §5 (b), which requires such approval
in conflict-of-interest situations. On the other hand, it could be argued that since
§ 3(c) (1), permitting the retention of the trustee's own stock, is expressly exempted
from the requirement of § 5 (b), such exemption impliedly extends to the voting of such
stock, which the Act implicitly regards as a normal incident of ownership. In all events,
a trustee is commonly authorized to vote the stock pursuant to a routine powers clause
contained in the trust instrument.
8 See Hoover, supra note 40, at 23.
See Helms, Retention of Own Stock in Trust, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 434
(1962). The author there points out the special likelihood of disloyalty stemming
from the inside knowledge of the trustee concerning its own corporate affairs,
and recommends "a very technical and conservative policy regarding retention," even
where it is permitted by local law.
S"The consent of the beneficiary, after full disclosure, will of course protect
the trustee from liability. 2 Scorr § 170.15, at 1240; §§ 216-216.3. Cf. Ellinger
v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 897, 290 N.Y.Supp. 616 (1936) (consent of
settlor).
'Equity has an inherent power to authorize acts which would otherwise be
deemed violations of the duty of loyalty, where the same are shown to be to the

19661

TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT

stock is involved, and especially if it has significance in terms of corporate control, a settlor would normally have the stock enough in
mind to authorize its retention. The trustee is in all events permitted
a reasonable time in which to dispose of it. 4
It may be suggested that the settlor, in placing the stock in the
trust, must have expected the trustee to retain it. But this suggestion
has little weight in the case of a testamentary trust, where the settlor
often thinks of his assets only in general terms, and without reference
to the specific securities which he might happen to own at the time
of his death.'5 From the fact that the testator held the investment
himself at a time when he had complete power of disposition and
his interest alone was involved, it cannot be inferred that he would
want it retained by a corporation whose administration of the asset
might be affected by its own interest. In the case of an inter vivos
trust, the argument that the settlement of the asset impliedly approves
its retention has more weight. But here there is a large chance that
the settlor was not aware of the possibilities of conflict inherent in the
situation. The trustee, however, is fully aware of these possibilities
and should refuse to accept its own stock on trust without first disclosing the potential embarrassments to the settlor and obtaining
definitive instructions as to his wishes. If the settlor intends that the
trustee retain the stock despite the possibility of conflict, an express
authorization can easily be inserted in the trust instrument.
Finally, it may be asserted that the beneficiaries are sufficiently
protected by section 3(a) of the proposed Act, which requires the
trustee to act as a "prudent man" would act, and by section 3(b),
which enjoins him to act "with due regard to his obligation as a
fiduciary." Neither of these provisions, unfortunately, addresses itadvantage of the trust. Court approval, in the absence of fraudulent concealment
by the trustee, will relieve the trustee of liability for what would otherwise be
self-dealing. Pollack v. Bowman, 140 N.J.Eq. 417, 55 A.2d 8 (1947); BOGERT § 543

(U) 2.

The independent scrutiny of the court should supply the element of disinterested
objectivity presumed to be lacking in the trustee's judgment. In the absence of
contest, however, the court is likely to approve perfunctorily the trustee's application, and the element of impartial scrutiny will in practice be lacking. There is
merit in Professor Fratcher's suggestion that courts appoint special trustees, empowered to authorize, subject to fiduciary responsibility, self-dealing by the original
trustee. Fratcher, Trustees' Power Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 627, 661-62 (1962).
" What constitutes a reasonable time depends on all the circumstances, including
the size of the block of stock, and the availability of a ready market. See 2

Scorr § 170.15, at 1240.

" When shares of the corporate trustee are specifically mentioned in the will
or the trust instrument, and sometimes even when they are not, a general power
to retain original investments will be construed to authorize the retention of the
trustee's shares. 2 Scorr § 170.15.
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self to the central problem posed by conflicts of interest. The law has
always required trustees to act prudently and loyally. The propensity
of frail humans to violate these canons gave rise to the rules against
conflicting interest. As to the trustee's retention of its own stock, our
special concern is not that the trustee will misjudge its virtue as an
investment. If it is a palpably bad investment, the trustee will be surcharged for its retention as he would for the improper retention of any
other stock. Rather, our fear is that the trustee's private interest will
warp its judgment (consciously or otherwise) and deprive the beneficiary of that objectivity to which he is entitled; and that this perversion of judgment may seriously endanger the beneficiary's interest,
and yet be too subtle to detect and redress.
2. Section 3(c)(20). Section 3(c)(20) authorizes a trustee "to
pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other expenses incurred in the collection, care, administration and protection
of the trust." While it might at first sight appear that this section
authorizes only the ministerial act of "payment," on reflection it becomes evident that the statute authorizes the trustee to determine
its own commissions.
The amount of compensation due a trustee has, in the absence of an
express provision in the trust agreement, traditionally been subject
to strict legal control, in the form either of a statutory rate schedule,
or of a requirement for judicial approval.8 6 When the amount to
which the trustee is entitled has been ascertained, the mechanical act
of "payment" requires no separate or additional authorization. Similarly, a trustee does not need authorization to "pay" taxes, or expenses of administration.8 7 To the extent that such expenses are
properly incurred for purposes reasonably necessary to the administration of the trust estate, the trustee has no choice but to pay them
or to be sued for them. The purpose of the statute, then, must be
to permit the trustee to exercise its judgment as to the necessity and
propriety of these items, without being subject to the risk of surcharge if, on a subsequent accounting, a court should disagree. So,
in the case of the trustee's compensation, the purpose must be to
authorize the trustee to ascertain the amount of the commissions
"' See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TRUSTS

§ 242, comment b (1959) ; 4 PowELL,

REAL

PROPERTY § 550 (1965) ; 3 ScoTT §242.
'A trustee may incur expenses which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the trust, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 188 (1959), may bind the

trust estate for such expenses properly incurred, id. § 271, and is entitled to indemnification from the trust estate if he has paid such expenses from his private funds, id. § 244.
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to which it is reasonably entitled. Such in all events is the interpretation put upon it by its framers.8"
The section, so construed, would abrogate conventional notions of
fiduciary loyalty in a manner totally unprecedented. 89 If ever there
is an obvious case of conflict between the interest of the trustee and
that of the beneficiary, it is in the matter of commissions. Every
cent the trustee receives is a direct impost on the beneficial interest
in the trust.
At common law, it was originally held that a trustee was not
entitled to compensation unless the trust instrument contained specific
authorization. 0 Although this rule has been universally abrogated
either by statute or by judicial decision, there appears to be no
jurisdiction in which the commission is not regulated, either by a
statutory scale of commissions or by subjecting it to judicial determination."'
As to services rendered by the trustee outside the normal scope of his
fiduciary duties (e.g., acting as attorney to the trust, or as broker in the
I See Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WAsHr. L. REv. 1, 23
(1966), where it is stated that, "at common law... [a trustee's compensation] could
not be fixed by the trustee himself. This subsection changes that rule subject to
fiduciary accountability." In seeming contradiction to this statement, footnote
127 of the same article states that "Statutes fixing the amount, or providing a
procedure for fixing the amount, are not superseded.' Unfortunately, neither the
words of the proposed Act nor anything in the cited analysis, indicate the grounds
for this latter assertion. On the contrary, it would seem that, pursuant to normal
principles of statutory construction, the Uniform Act, if adopted, would supersede prior inconsistent statutes or precedents. While statutory rate tables might not
be deemed inconsistent with the Act, (it might be supposed that the trustee should
make his determination in accordance with such tables), any statute or custom
subjecting fiduciary commissions to judicial determination in the first instance,
would seem to contradict the discretion given by the Act to the trustee. At very
least, the Act would seem to limit the court to a determination whether the trustee, in
fixing the commission, acted with proper motives, and would take away the jurisdiction
of the court to determine the commission de novo on its own judgment.
It would seem that § 5 (b), requiring court approval for self-dealing transactions,
does not apply to fee determinations under § 3(c) (20). To require such approval
would render § 3 (c)(20) meaningless. Although a clear conflict of interest is inherent
in all fee determinations, the rule of statutory construction that general provisions must
yield to specific provisions requires the conclusion that § 5 (b) is not applicable to these
transactions.
I Professor Fratcher points out that trustees' powers legislation has not tended
to relax those "restringent" rules relating to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
See Fratcher, supra note 83, at 639, 642. Rules against self-dealing have in fact often
been codified. Id. at 643.
LEWIN, TRUSTS 388-90 (15th ed. 1940).
In England, corporate trustees may now receive compensation upon judicial
allowance. See TRUSTEE AcT § 42 (1925). The fees of "custodian trustees" who
have no management powers, are charged in accordance with a schedule promulgated
by the Public Trustee. PUBLIc TRUSTEE ACT §§ 4(3),9 (1906) ; Hosldngs, Corporate
Executors and Trustees, 112 L.J. 796, 797-8 (1962). The American practice is various,
but there appears to be no jurisdiction in which fees requested by a trustee are accorded

prima facie validity. See RESTATEaIENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 242, comment b (1959);
BoGERr § 974; POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 550 (1965) ; ScoTT § 242.
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sale of trust assets), it is still widely held that he may receive no compensation in the absence of authorization by the trust instrument. 2
Those jurisdictions which allow compensation for such ancillary services, commonly subject the matter to judicial determination."
It is of course true that the trustee is required to assess his compensation "with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary."94 But
section 3 (c) (20) accords to his judgment a prima facie validity in a
situation where, more than any other, the trustee's personal advantage
is at stake. This is especially deplorable in view of the vagueness of
the standards on which, in many jurisdictions, the amount of a trustee's
compensation is based. In the absence of a statutory rate scale, 5
there is no precise rule for computing a reasonable commission. Relevant considerations are the amount and character of the trust property,
the extent of risk and responsibility, the nature of the services rendered, the degree of difficulty encountered, and the skill and success
of the trustee.96 What trustee will not judge that his own skills are
beyond compare, his energies inexhaustible, and his difficulties the
most vexatious?
It is simple enough in the case of an inter vivos trust, and often
in the case of a testamentary trust, for a trustee to agree with the
settlor (or testator) on the matter of commissions. Having failed to
do so, it seems entirely insupportable that the trustee should be
permitted to set a value on its own services, applying standards which
put a premium on self-serving rationalization. But even in those
testamentary situations97 where the trustee had no opportunity to
negotiate the governing document, the impossibility of its exercising
disinterested judgment as to the value of its services makes any
presumption of the validity of that judgment thoroughly unrealistic.
"In re Hallenback's Estate, 122 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1954); In re Lair's
Estate, 70 Cal. App. 2d 330, 161 P.2d 228 (1945) ; Gray v. Robertson, 174 Ill. 442, 51
N.E. 248 (1898) ; Burr v. Contenti, 102 N.J. Eq. 41, 139 Atl. 801 (1929). Cf. Behrman
v. Egan, 17 N.J. Super. 598, 86 A.2d 606 (1952) ; It re Wallach, 164 App. Div. 600,
150 N.Y. Supp. 302, aff'd, 215 N.Y. 622, 109 N.E. 1094 (1914).
See BOGERT § 543 (M) ; especially nn. 87-89 and cases cited therein.
"Act § 3 (b).
"Where statutory rate scales exist, they often set only a maximum limit on
compensation, within which judicial discretion must still determine the trustee's

fee in accordance with the vague standards hereafter recited. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TRUSTS § 242, comment b (1959).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 242, comment b (1959).
07 In probate matters, trustees'
commissions are commonly subjected to the same
judicial controls as executors' commissions. If the proponents are correct in
supposing that such controls are unaffected by the proposed Act (See note 88 supra),
the Act would seem largely nugatory with respect to testamentary trusts.
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3. Section 3(c)(24). Section 3(c)(24) authorizes a trustee "to
employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors and
agents, even if they are associated with the trustee, to advise or
assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative duties; to
act without independent investigation upon their recommendations;
and instead of acting personally, to employ one or more agents to
perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary.
The more flagrantly offensive aspects of this clause are its tendency
to enlarge unduly the power to delegate, together with its exculpatory
feature, both of which will be treated hereafter. 8 The clause does,
however, contribute to the unfortunate tendency of the Act to downgrade fiduciary loyalty, and in this aspect merits mention here.
The courts have always looked askance at self-hiring. In England,
it was long held that a trustee could not be compensated for the
performance of "extraordinary" services to a trust.99 Thus, a trustee
was not entitled to compensation for acting as attorney in litigation
or rendering other "legal" services.'
Nor could he be compensated
for service as broker or auctioneer.' This attitude may have stemmed
in part from the early rule that a trustee, as such, was entitled to no
compensation even for the normal services of fiduciary administration.10 But it also reflected a recognition that, to permit a trustee to
be compensated for rendering extraordinary services, would tempt him
to create a job for which there was no need, or to employ himself to do
services for which others would be better qualified. 03 The same
inhibition extended to the employment of those closely associated
with the trustee, 0 4 whether or not the trustee shared directly in the
compensation. 5 It was realistically appreciated that a trustee would
See part III infra.
v. White, 10 Beav. 523 (1847); Sutton v. Jones, 15 Ves. 584
(1809) ; BOGERT § 543 (M) ; LvIN, TRUSTS 207-08 (15th ed. 1950). But see
Cradock v. Piper, 1 Mfac. & G. 664 (1850).
'"Broughton v. Broughton, 5 DeG. M.&G. 160, 164 (1855)
; LEvIN, TRUSTS 207-08
(15th ed. 1950).
'Christopher

...
Kirkman v. Booth, 11 Beav. 273 (1848) ; LEWIN,

TRUSTS

207-08 (15th ed. 1950).

But see It re Level, 2 Dom. L. R. 408 (1949).
I"See BOGERT § 974; LEWIN, TRUSTS 206, 388 (15th ed. 1950). The original
English Rule has been modified by the TRUSTEE AcT § 42 (1925), which permits
judicial authorization of fees to a corporate trustee. In the United States it is
universally recognized that a trustee is entitled to compensation for such services
as are ordinarily involved in the administration of a trust. ESTATEMENT (SEcom),
TRUSTS §242 (1959) ; 3 SCOTT § 242.
IuBOGERT § 543 (M); 3 SCOTT § 242.2. See Broughton v. Broughton, 5 DeG.
M.&G. 160, 164 (1855).
It re Hill, 1 Ch.623 (C.A. 1934) ; It re Corsellis, 34 Ch. D. 675 (C.A. 1887).
In re Gates, [1933] Ch.913.
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prefer to hire his business partners rather than a stranger, for reasons
having little bearing on the interest of the trust estate and the beneficiary.
While the inhibition against self-hiring (including the hiring of
associates) has had some acceptance in the United States,""0 it has
in perhaps a majority of cases been rejected. 1 7 Even in those juris-

dictions in which self-hiring is permitted, however, the transaction
will be judicially scrutinized, and the compensation will be limited to
the reasonable value of the services as judicially determined.
A much greater judicial wariness is manifest in the case of corporate
trustees. It appears to be generally accepted that a corporate trustee
may not hire itself, or one in its ordinary employ, to perform trust
services for compensation.0 8 The rule is sound. A person entrusting
the administration of his property to a corporate fiduciary would
normally expect to have the benefit of all those services which the
corporation is known to perform regularly. Since a corporation can
act only through natural persons in its employ or subject to its direction, to permit it to "hire" its regular corporate personnel, (i.e., to
charge the value of their services as an expense to the trust, in addition to its own compensation), would open the door to an unwarranted multiplication of fees. It can be assumed that in any borderline
1I0n re Hallenbae's Estate, 122 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1954) (member of
executor's law firm); In re Vokal's Estate, 121 Cal. App. 2d 252, 263 P2d 64
(1953) (trustee as attorney) ; In re Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132, 251 Pac. 907 (1927)
(executor's law firm) ; Gray v. Robertson, 174 Ill. 242, 51 N.E. 248 (1898) (trustee as
attorney) ; Burr v. Contenti, 102 N.J. Eq. 41, 139 Atl. 801 (1927) (trustee as attorney) ;
In re Lundberg's Will, 197 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1960) (trustee as broker) ; it re Wallach,
164 App. Div. 600, 150 N.Y. Supp. 302 (1914), aff'd, 215 N.Y. 622, 109 N.E. 1094
(1915) (trustee as attorney) ; Montaquila v. Montaquila, 85 R.I. 447, 133 A.2d 119
(1957) (trustee as broker). Cf. Behrman v. Egan, 17 N.J. Super 598, 86 A2d 606
(1951), (trustee paid self counsel fees through an employee concealing self-dealing
from beneficiary). See also itre Eckel's Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C. 383 (1940) (trustee,
if sole fiduciary, must elect between attorney's fee and trustee's commission where
legal work is routine).
l'See, e.g., Babcock v. Hubbard, 56 Conn. 284, 15 At. 791 (1888) (trustee
as attorney) ;In re Lieber's Estate, 103 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1958) (trustee as attorney)
it re Dean's Trust, 47 Hawaii 629, 394 P.2d 432 (1964) (executor as broker);
Norris v. Bishop, 207 Ky. 621, 269 S.W. 751 (1925); Shelton v. McHaney, 340
Mo. 119, 119 S.W.2d 951 (1938); itre Bogert's Estate, 24 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Surr.
Ct. 1940) (trustee as broker); Swank v. Reherd, 181 Va. 943, 27 S.E.2d 191
(1943) (executor as attorney); In re Guardianship of Robinson, 9 Wn. 2d 525,
115 P.2d 734 (1941) (guardian as attorney) ; see 3 ScoTT § 242.2.
In some of the above cases the trustee was co-fiduciary with another. That the
courts may be more liberal in that event is suggested by the English case of
Cradock v. Piper, 1 Mac. & G. 664 (1850). LEWIN, op. cit.,upra note 102, at
210, considers the case "anomalous" and "not likely to be extended."
1'Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N. J. Eq. 493, 60 A2d 630,
opinion supplemented, 142 N.J. Eq. 632, 61 A.2d 297 (Ch. 1948), modified, 6 N.J.
Super. 196, 70 A.2d 784, affd, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950) (trust company not permitted to accept fee for examining or insuring title) ; Purchase v. Atlantic Safe Deposit
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case, a corporate trustee would judge that the services performed by
its employees are "extraordinary," and in view of the indistinctness of
the line between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" services, could probably build a plausible brief in support of its determination.
Section 3 (c) (24) appears to modify existing law in several respects.
First of all, it blanketly authorizes the trustee to appoint "persons
associated with [it]." Presumably this would permit an individual
trustee to employ his partners to perform services for the trust in
jurisdictions which do not now permit it. In the case of the corporate
trustee, however, the effect would be far more extensive. While the
word "associate" has no established legal meaning, it seems likely
that it would include officers, directors, and possibly employees of a
corporation. It therefore appears that the Act might abrogate or at
least weaken the rule that a corporate trustee may not hire its regular
employees to perform trust services.
The Act, however, not only broadens the circle of persons to whom
trust business can be consigned; it also expands the kinds of activity
that can be delegated. At least in the United States, it is universally
accepted that a trustee may not delegate acts which are a normal and
customary aspect of trust administration-those which "the trustee
can reasonably be required personally to perform."'0 9 Section 3(c)
(24) provides that the trustee may employ agents "to advise or assist
the trustee in the performance of his administrative duties" and "to
perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary."
It is clear, therefore, that the trustee's authority to employ agents
extends to acts which are a normal and ordinary part of trust administration. True, he can employ agents only when a "prudent man"
might do so, but this is quite different from limiting him to those acts
which he can not be reasonably expected to perform himself."'
& Trust Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 344, 87 Atl. 444 (1913) (director of corporate trustee not
entitled to fee for finding purchaser for trust property) ; MacDonald v. Eastern Trust
Co, 12 D.L.R.2d 92 (1957) (employee of corporate trustee not entitled to fee for legal
services).
Cf. BOGERT § 555, at 55, that since a corporation can act only through natural
persons, "the use of officers and employees is not delegation but rather the action

of the trustee itself." See

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND),

TRUSTS

§ 171, comment d (1959),

that a corporation may alvays act through its proper officers, and § 225, comment b, that regular officers and employees of a corporate trustee (as contrasted
with persons specially employed to perform some particular service in the management of trust property, e.g., janitors of building held in trust) are not "agents"
for purposes of the rule exonerating a trustee from liability for breaches of trust
committed by "agents" properly selected and supervised. See also ScoTT § 225.2.
1
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRusTs § 171 (1959).
The distinction is emphasized in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 171, comment d (1959).
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A prudent man might often employ an attorney, an investment
advisor, or a custodian in the management of his own affairs, not because of strict necessity, but for purposes of convenience. In the
administration of a trust, he might solicit the advice of an attorney as
to the construction of routine dispositive or administrative clauses, or
as to routine questions concerning allocation of principal and income.
A corporate trustee, however, would not be expected to employ (at an
expense to be charged to the trust) an attorney to advise it as to
everyday "legal" matters with which a trust officer could be deemed
to be conversant, or which a large bank handles through counsel on
its corporate staff.
A "prudent man," obliged to file a fiduciary income tax return on
Form 1041, would surely be lost without the assistance of a lawyer or
an accountant, even in the case of a very ordinary "simple" trust.
A corporate trustee, however, would not be expected to seek special
assistance for preparing this return unless problems of unusual complexity were presented.
A "prudent man" would surely keep his securities in a safe deposit
box. Administering a trust of some size, he might hire a bookkeeper
to record his receipts and expenditures. But a settlor or beneficiary
would have cause for surprise if a corporate trustee levied an additional
charge for such services.
No doubt the courts would frown, even under section 3(c) (24), on
the corporate trustee who sought to charge as an administrative expense the salaries of its bookkeepers. But a fair reading of the Act
would seem to allow a trust company to charge separately for such
items as legal services, investment advice, mortgage placement services, brokerage, and perhaps the more exalted varieties of accounting
services, supplied by its own officers, directors, and employees.'
When section 3(c) (24) is read in conjunction with section 3(c)
(20), there is cause for greater apprehension. Not only may a trustee
delegate a greater variety of jobs to close associates; it may also
determine their compensation. Prudence and loyalty are of course
piously enjoined, and the fees paid to the trustee's associates, like any
other expense, must be "reasonable." But there is a world of difference
between the attitude of a court considering whether an expense presented as a fait accompli on a routine accounting is "reasonably
I If it is claimed that the suggested results are not intended, the Act should be
redrafted to make that clear. They do not, in the writer's opinion, represent
an unfair gloss on the present language of § 3(c) (24), which exhibits a merry freedom
from the constraint of customary words of art.
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incurred," and a court sitting to determine, on application, what
amount shall be allowed as "the reasonable value of the services performed." The opportunities for improper multiplication of fees and
expenses inherent in the present language of section 3(c)(24) require at least the corrective of meticulous redrafting.
D. The CorporateFiduciaryand the Duty of Loyalty
It has often been suggested that the law of trust administration
must be updated. Many of the rules of law inhibiting the discretion
of trustees are seen as unwelcome relics of an earlier time when the
trust was primarily a vehicle for accommodation of dynastic ambition,
and the trustee principally a repository of title having little or no
112
responsibility for active management and investment.
Today the trust accomplishes a far broader array of purposes. The
predominance of personal property, and especially corporate securities,
as the form in which wealth is laid up, has greatly enlarged the
trustee's investment responsibility. The quest for tax benefits has
given rise to the use of discretionary powers to a degree unprecedented
in the trust practice of the last century." 3 Furthermore, the management of trust property is increasingly in the hands of corporate
trustees, whose special qualifications and skills must be realistically
recognized.
Thus, the argument is made that the trustee must be accorded
powers in keeping with his responsibilities, and should not be hindered
by a formalistic legal straitjacket which precludes effective and economic management of the trust estate in accordance with sound business
practice.

14

As to those rules of law which relate principally to the trustee's
management and investment of property, this argument has much to
commend it. The meteoric increase in the quantum of assets held in
trust is a fact of major economic significance." 5 Undue conservatism
Fratcher, supra note 83, at 658; Horowitz, supranote 88, at 1-4.
In the case of non-marital trusts, for example, the wife's powers with
respect to the trust estate must be strictly limited to insure its exclusion from
her taxable estate. The desire to make the fund liberally available for her benefit
often requires the vesting of broad discretion in the trustee. Similarly, possibilities
of income tax advantage have given rise to the "spray" or "sprinkling" trust, in
which the trustee is given a broad discretionary power over the disposition of
trust income (and sometimes principal).
11, See Fratcher, supra note 83, at 658; Horowitz, supra note 88, at 1-4.
' The total volume of trust assets in the United States rose from a negligible
amount in 1904 to an estimated $75 billion in 1953. 93 TRUSTS & EsTATs
320 (1954). A study conducted by the Comptroller of the Currency disclosed that,
1

"
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in the investment of trust assets could exert a dampening influence
on economic growth. These circumstances, as well as a desire to
accord to trust beneficiaries the advantages of economic management,
warrant a liberalization of trustees' investment powers. 1 6
Those rules of law, however, which embody the basic concerns of
fiduciary responsibility (principally the rules relating to the fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care) are governed by very different considerations. The growth of the commercial importance of trust business,
and the consignment of broad discretion to impersonal corporate
fiduciaries, if anything, require their strengthening.
The overall increase in the volume of trust business has brought with
it a corresponding increase in its importance as a source of profit to
professional fiduciaries. Whereas a half-century ago fiduciary services
were extended primarily as an accommodation to bank customers,
17
in 1963 trust department incomes aggregated 573 million dollars?
The increase in the economic importance of trust business has
engendered a change in the attitudes of professional fiduciaries toward
their calling. In early times a corporate trustee, extending an essentially unprofitable service as a sideline to its principal business,""
could be expected to be untainted by motives of self-preferment. For
the most part it served men of wealth and of substantial affairs.
Any departure from rigid attitudes of confidence, any trace of selfdealing, would likely be detected, and would be quick to damage the
reputation of the banking house.
Today trust administration is a large and profitable business enterprise. The quest for profit is a major motive. Necessarily, the ethics
of the trusted family retainer and confidant give way to the ethics
of the market place. The fiduciary comes more and more to see himself as engaged in a service business, dealing at arms length with
the settlor and beneficiary.
at the end of 1963, "national banks had investment responsibility for $65 billion
in trust assets" (appraised at actual market value). The total for "all commercial
banks" amounted to $144 billion. (This latter figure presumably includes an
unascertained number of book-value appraisals.) Of this, $43 billion consisted of
pension and profit-sharing accounts. 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 542 (1964). By
another estimate, securities held in bank trust departments in 1962 amounted to
$170 billion, or 59% of all institutional holdings. McFarland, Marketing Trust
Services, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1132 (1964).
" See note 7 supra.
1'103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1183 (1964). For general corroboration of the changing
character of trust business, and its increasing economic importance in the reckoning
of bankers, see correspondence from bank executives printed under the heading A
View from the Top, in 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 332 (1964).
SAs to the traditional unprofitability of trust business, see Lynch, Trust
Salesmen-Key to New Business, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 112, 114 (1962).
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This trend is well recognized among trustmen, and has caused some
consternation in the industry. In April 1964, Trusts and Estates
editorialized that "the striving for profitability in trust business, laudable as it is, should not obscure the traditional principles and the
ideals of trusteeship.""' 9 In the same issue we hear of a widespread
apprehension among experienced trust administrators that "we older
trustmen in our leadership and inspiration of young trustmen are not
placing due emphasis upon the principles and ideals of trust business
and are letting the impression gain ground that it is only another
business, conducted primarily for profit."' 2 The author exhorts trustmen to study the history of equity jurisprudence, to come to a fuller
understanding of the ethical imperatives on which their craft is
founded.' 2' In the same year, incidentally, in which the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act was promulgated, an experienced trustman laments that "our business is peculiarly liable to put temptations before our fiduciary employees."' 22 He warns that, although unethical
conduct of trust personnel has "not been a serious problem ... the

time for enlightened trust department managements to take action
is now, before the situation reaches the serious stage."'

23

The source of the problem is candidly stated:' 2 4
We encourage ...

employees at all levels ... tax clerks, custody

officers, vault people, new business developers, trust and estate ad-

ministrators ... to ferret out and bring in people of wealth who need

help in caring for their property. Frequently these are lonely men
and women for whom friendships are important.
The author, in this article, deals primarily with possible conflicts of
interest between the bank and its employees. 2 5 The same commercialism which comes between the bank and its employees, however,
m 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 316 (1964).
-- Stephenson, Idealism in Trust Business, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 322 (1964).

The author is a past president of the Trust Division of the American Bankers
Association, and is a well-known teacher and prolific writer on fiduciary subjects.
"I Stephensen, supra note 120, passim.
'= Harris, Code of Ethics for Trustine, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1186 (1964).
The author was then President of the Trust Division of the American Banker's
Association and the executive vice president of a large metropolitan bank.
' Harris, supra note 122, at 1186. See also Van Aartsen, Statement of Policies
on Conflict of Interests of Corporate Fiduciaries, 103 TRUST & ESTATES 372,

380 (1964), in which the author expresses surprise that few large corporate fiduciaries
have formulated policy statements on conflict of interest.
'* Harris, supra note 122, at 1186.
Harris recommends, for example, that trust personnel be prohibited from
accepting any but nominal gifts from bank customers, id. at 1187, and that no
employee be permitted to act as a fiduciary or co-fiduciary, except in the estate
of a relative, without the approval of the bank. The purpose of the latter rule,
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may equally jeopardize the interest of beneficiaries. This the author
recognizes in a recommendation that no employee be permitted to
buy or sell trust property. "Even open auctions run by independent
auctioneers should be barred to employees. The suspicion of collusion, or the possibility of better inside knowledge, is enough to require this even against the argument that the more bidders, the
better the auction. Appraised values, or asking prices, are no real
protection."' 26 The author suggests that improper practices have already made extensive inroads,'2 7 and that, where employees have been
making a substantial income from gifts, salary revision might be in
12 8

order.

The profitability of trust business has brought with it the development of vigorous marketing techniques quite out of keeping with the
image of disinterested professionalism'2 9 dear to the corporate fiduciary. The employment of full-time salesmen has become standard
practice. 3 0 "Personal confrontation with the prospect-going to the
market place-seeking out the prospect and asking for his business:
these are the only way to achieve sales results."'131 "Persistence is
absolutely essential, because trust business is not sold on a single
call, but only after many calls, as well as attempted calls and meetings.
Very often it is a matter of years before a case is completely finished
and signed up, and if the salesman is not persistent the sale is not
made or goes elsewhere."', 2 "One of the worse offenses is to produce
he acknowledges, is "to obtain customers for the bank" Id. at 1190. The author
suggests that an employee might be permitted to act as co-fiduciary with the bank if
he first agrees to turn his compensation over to the bank, and further agrees that,
in case his judgment differs from that of the bank as to any discretionary decision,
the bank's judgment will prevail. "The possibility of his voting contrary to the
bank on an important matter is not acceptable. Anong other things, it would weaken
the bank's position in any surcharge proceeding." Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
The perceptive reader may well wonder to what extent these suggestions exhibit
traditional attitudes of loyalty and full disclosure (quaere, what is the "co-fiduciary"
being paid for, if he is subordinating his judgment to that of the bank), and to
what extent they reveal a commercial and "arms-length" attitude toward the interest
of the beneficiary.
'IId. at 1186.
" "For most banks, adoption of a policy on these subjects will uncover some
situations which require special treatment" Id. at 1190.
Ibid.
"There is no business which needs to be more alert than our own to the
vital importance of being endowed with a favorable public image. There must
be no reservations as to our integrity, our ability or our undeviating high standards
of conduct. We can afford no hint of divided loyalty or self-interest." Staner,
Public Image of Corporate Trustee, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES 552 (1963).
Lynch, Trust Salesmen-Key to New Business, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 112

(1962).

I Vunderink, Contest for Trust Busiwss-Applying Corporate Sales Techniques
to FiduciaryServices, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 652 (1964).
...
Lynch, supranote 118, at 112.
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guardianships and small accounts are the
'junk' business. 13Veteran's
' 3
offenders.
worst
We have come far indeed from the times when Chancery decreed
that to allow compensation to a trustee would create an ungovernable
conflict of interest. In the light of the needs of contemporary society,
it is entirely honorable for a trustee to consider its legitimate business
interests in determining whether to accept a trust, and to seek to
discover increasingly expeditious techniques of administration. Nor is
there any impropriety in attempts by the fiduciary industry to secure
long-range commercial objectives through advertising, salesmanship, or
the solicitation of favorable legislation.
But those entrusted with the responsibility for establishing legal
rules must recognize that the trustee's pursuit of profit necessarily
casts him in a commercial, arms-length, and to some degree adversary,
relationship to settlors and beneficiaries; that under contemporary
conditions, the maintenance of high standards of fiduciary conduct
requires vigilance.
The rules of law which long experience has shown necessary to maintain the high standards of conduct generally practiced by fiduciaries
and to which they owe their reputation, should not be relaxed.
II. THE DUTY To EXERCISE CAPE AND SKILL
The fiduciary duty to exercise care and skill, while normally treated
as separate and distinct from the duty of loyalty, has much in common
with that duty and may in large measure be logically derived from
it. A trustee who acts loyally-i.e., solely in the interest of the beneficiary-will act as carefully as if his own interest were at stake.
He will treat the beneficiary as he himself would wish to be treated.
Just as the duty of loyalty stands in antagonism to self-interest, so
does the duty of care. The interest of the beneficiary requires that
the trustee be diligent and take sufficient pains to do things properly.
The trustee's personal interest will on occasion tempt him to save
time, and to find an easy way which may not be the best. The
same human failings which require the duty of loyalty to be clearly
stated and stringently enforced must not be ignored in formulating
1 34
standards of care and skill.

at 115.
attitude
See Id. at 115.
'Id.

''The

of some fiduciaries

toward

"junk business"

has been noted.
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Section 3 (a) of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act permits a trustee
to perform-"5 "every act which a prudent man would perform for the
purposes of the trust including, but not limited to, the powers specified" in section 3(c).
In section 1(3), a "prudent man" is defined as "a trustee whose
exercise of trust powers is reasonable and equitable in view of the
interests of income or principal beneficiaries, or both, and in view of
the manner in which men of ordinary prudence, diligence, discretion
and judgment would act in the management of their own affairs."
Construed together, these sections appear to require of the trustee
that degree of care and skill employed by "men of ordinary prudence,
diligence, discretion and judgment" in their own affairs.130
It is believed that the standard embodied in the Act is an inadequate
formulation of present law, and makes do with a standard of care
and skill lower than might be reasonably expected under modern
conditions.
It has been commonly held that a trustee must act with the care
and skill which a hypothetical "prudent man" would exercise in the
conduct of his own affairs.' 37 This formulation was adequate in an
age when trustees were commonly friends of the settlor, chosen for
their personal reliability and perhaps general business experience.
In times when prevailing economic thought made much of personal
financial benefit as a dominant factor in human motivation, the standard implied was a high one. Surely if trustees acted with the care
which "prudent" men use in their own affairs, the beneficiary would
be well served.
But even before the corporate trustee assumed its modern importance, it was seen that the traditional formula, taken literally, might
be misleading, in that it fails to make clear that a trustee's diligence
must be viewed in the light of the38business in which he is engaged.
In In re Whiteley, the court said:
[C] are must be taken not to lose sight of the fact that the business of the
trustee, and the business which the ordinary prudent man is supposed
Subject, of course, to the requirement that he "act with due regard to his
obligation as a fiduciary." Act § 3(b).
" The words "care" and "skill" do not appear. However, the words "reasonable," "prudence," "diligence" and "discretion" or like words form the core of
traditional definitions of the fiduciary duty of care, and there can be no doubt that
the cited sections delineate the scope of this duty. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),
TRUSTS § 174 (1959); 2 SCOTT § 174; see also Horowitz, supra note 88, at 10.
'12 Scorr § 174; In re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Ati. 730, 731
(1934) ; Exchange Trust Co. v. Doudera, 270 Mass. 227, 170 N.E. 73 (1930).
"'L.R. 33 Ch. Div. 347, 355 (1875).

19661

TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT

to be conducing for himself, is the business of investing money for
the benefit of persons who are to enjoy it at some future time, and not
for the sole benefit of the person entitled to the present income. The
duty of a trustee is not to take such care only as a prudent man would
take if he had only himself to consider; the duty rather is to take such
care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he were minded to
make an investment for the benefit of other people for whom he felt
morally bound to provide.
That overtones of confidence and a conserving function distinguish the
"business" of a trustee from that of a businessman acting in his own
interest is recognized in the Statement of Principles of Trust Institutions adopted in 1933 by the Executive Committee of the Trust
Division of the American Bankers Association, which provides that
a trustee must "exercise the care a prudent man familiar with such
matters would exercise as trustee of the property of others, adhering
to the rule that the trustee is primarily a conserver."' 39
Also, although there is little direct authority on the subject, it
seems clear on principle that where a trustee's skills or facilities are
superior to those of the ordinary "prudent man," he must make use
of his actual skills and take advantage of facilities available to him. 4 '
An agent is held to the use of his actual skills where they are superior;1 41 a trustee should be held to at least as high a standard. 4 2
And where a trustee holds himself out as possessing greater than
ordinary skill or facilities, he should be required to live up to his
43
representations.1
As we have seen, 4 it is increasingly the custom of professional
trustees to engage in the active solicitation of business for profit.
In doing so, they do not neglect the techniques of modern advertising."' ; With justification, they emphasize their special competence
and facilities in handling problems of investment and other aspects of
' See also In re Cook's Will, 136 N.J. Eq. 123, 40 A.2d 805 (Prer. 1945);
In re Park's Trust, 39 Wn. 2d 763, 238 P2d 1205 (1951).
". BOGrT § 541, at 454-58; 2 Scow § 174, at 1297.
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 379 (1957).
See Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167, 80 P.2d 296 (1938).
Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N.J.Eq. 493, 60 A2d 630, suppleierited, 142 N.J.Eq. 632, 61 A.2d 297 (Ch. 1948), modified, 6 NJ. Super. 196,
70 A.2d 784 (App. Div.), aff'd, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950); see Tannenbaum
v. Seacoast Trust Co. of Asbury Park, 16 N.J. Misc. 234, 198 Atl. 855 (CIL
1938), aff'd, 125 N.J.Eq. 360, 5 A2d 778 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). The result is
consonant with the general liability, on tort principles, of one who fails to
exercise the degree of skill which he has professed. See COOLEY, ToRTs § 472 (4th
ed. 1932).
'"Part
II D supra.
5
"
See Anderson, Trust Advertising Through the Years, 93 TRusTs & ESTATS
306 (1954).
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trust administration.1 46 A settlor, consigning the management of his
estate to a trust company on the basis of such representations, should
147
be protected in his reliance.
Common sense establishes that a corporate trustee, staffed with
personnel devoting all their time to the management of trusts and
estates, supported by full-time clerical and bookkeeping help, and having sources of information and advice unavailable or not widely known
to the general public, can be expected to conduct the affairs of a
trust with greater competence than the average intelligent laymen
lacking these facilities.
The duty to exercise its superior skills is acknowledged by the profession. 4 8 The courts have tended increasingly to recognize and
enforce this duty.'49 The Restatement of Trusts provides that, "if
the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing
that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence,
he is under a duty to exercise such skill.""' It is suggested that this
formulation is realistically addressed to the needs of our times.
The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, in adhering without qualification to the traditional statement of the trustees' duty of care, appears
to reject the proposition that a trustee should be required to exercise
any superior skills which it actually has or represents itself to have.
...
T. E. McFarland, supra note 115:
The least a prospective trust customer should expect is professional competence.
Expertise should be available in the fields of estate and trust administration,
taxes and investments....
Technical competence is only one side of the coin, however. The prospective customer must be persuaded that his affairs will be handled with a
seriousness of purpose that will put his family's interest before all else, and
that relationships will be conducted with sympathetic understanding of their
problems. He must believe that he is serving them best by involving this particular
bank in his will.
BOGERT § 541, at 456-7.
"
In the Statement of Principles of Trust Institutions, adopted by the Executive
Committee of the Trust Division of the American Banker's Association, it is
stated that: "A trust institution should devote to its trust investments all the
care and skill that it has or can reasonably acquire."
" Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N.J. Eq. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (Ch. 1948);
Dickersen v. Camden Trust Co. 140 N.J. Eq. 34, 53 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1947), aff'd, 1 N.J.
459, 64 A.2d 214 (1949) ; Tannenbaum v. Seacoast Trust Co. of Asbury Park, 16
N.J. Misc. 234, 198 At. 855 (Ch. 1938): Isham v. Post. 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E. 1084
(1894) ; In re Church's Will, 221 Wis. 472, 266 N.W. 210 (1936) ; In re Allis' Estate,
191 Wis. 23, 209 N.W. 945 (1926); National Trustee Co. of Australasia, Ltd. v.
General Fin. Co. of Australasia, Ltd., [1905] A.C. 373, 381 (Vict.). But see In re
Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 38, 148 At. 912, 914 (1930). See generally CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-16-7 (1963) ; BOGERT § 541; 2 SCOTT §§ 174, 174.1; Note, Standards
of Care by Corporate Trustees, 16 U. Ci. L. Rnv. 579 (1949).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 174 (1959). The phrase "or procures his
appointment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill than that of a
man of ordinary prudence" was added in 1957.
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This unfortunate retrogression is surely deserving of amendment by
adoption of a formulation along the lines of the Restatement.
III. DUTY NOT To DELEGATE, AND LABILITY FOR ACTS OF AGENTS
We have already spoken of the opportunities for self-dealing engendered by section 3 (c) (24) of the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act,
in so far as it broadens a trustee's power to delegate the performance of certain acts to "associates."'' We shall now consider two
other aspects of the same provision, which it is believed represent
a very significant erosion of existing standards of fiduciary responsibility: (1) by authorizing the trustee to delegate "any" act of administration, it greatly circumscribes the existing duty not to delegate;
and (2) by authorizing the trustee "to act without independent investigation upon [its agents'] recommendations," it exonerates the
trustee from substantial liabilities to which it is presently subject.
These two effects will be treated together since they are closely
interrelated. The first effect is objectionable largely because of its
incidental tendency to relieve the trustee from liabilities even under
existing rules of responsibility. The result of the second effect-relaxing the duties of supervision-is in turn greatly enlarged in view
of the broader delegation previously authorized.
It has been pointed out that under present law a trustee is permitted to delegate only those acts which he could not reasonably
be expected to perform personally.' 52 The Act, on the other hand,
would allow him to delegate "any act of administration,"'' 3 so long
as a "prudent man" might do it in the management of his own
affairs." 4 Circumstances have been suggested, and examples given, of
situations in which a "prudent man" might delegate particular acts
of administration, but a trustee should not.'55
The duty not to delegate derives from the nature of the trust relationship, not from the terms of the trust instrument.'
It recognizes that a settlor often selects a trustee because of personal confidence in him. Because a settlor has confidence in the ability of a
"I See part I C supra.
.'.
See note 109 supra and accompanying text.

I Act, § 3 (c)(24). The trustee may not "delegate the entire administration of the
trust." Act § 4. It is not clear at what point a delegation would become so broad as to
violate this interdiction.

'aAct, § 3 (a).
See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.

ScoTT § 171. The duty may, however, be waived by appropriate authorization contained in the trust instrument. Ibid.
'2
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given person to invest his money, we can not infer that he wishes to
subject his estate to the decisions of some agent selected by that
person, even in good faith.
This is as true today as it ever was, where individual fiduciaries
are appointed. The selection of such a trustee is often arrived at
after much consideration. Where the trustee is authorized to make
highly discretionary decisions concerning the distribution of benefits,
often involving delicate family considerations, the settlor would be
especially ill at ease to see these decisions entrusted to another, even
for reasons that might seem satisfactory to the trustee.'
In the case of a corporate trustee, which acts only through its
agents, the argument loses some force 1 -- but not altogether. A settlor
bases his selection of a corporate trustee on the reputation of the
corporate establishment, as to which his judgment is often colored
by institutional advertising. He still expects that the administration
of the trust will be performed by the corporation's regular personnel
(who may themselves have played a part in attracting his interest)
and not by outsiders.
The Act, however, applies indiscriminately to individual and corporate trustees, and in either case is capable of defeating the legitimate expectations of settlors as to the source of the services they
will receive.
But the most serious impact of the clause broadening the power to
delegate, derives from its effect on existing rules of the trustee's
responsibility for breach of trust.
It is important at this point to draw a distinction between the
liability of a trustee to third parties, and his liability to the beneficiary for acts of his agent. A trustee is liable to a third party in
accordance with normal agency principles: in tort and in contract,
he is liable for the agent's conduct within the scope of his actual or
apparent authority, whether or not the trustee is personally at fault.","
As to the beneficiary, however, the trustee, when the law authorizes
' A similar policy underlies the rule of contract law that an obligation to
perform personal services is not delegable by the obligor.
I BOGERT § 555, at 55. See 2 Scowt § 171.4.
It has sometimes been loosely stated that the rule prohibiting delegation does

not apply to a corporate trustee. See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264
Ill. 31, 105 N.E. 718 (1914). This, however, is not precisely true. A corporation
must of course operate through employees, and when it does so, any act done in its
name by its regular personnel is not deemed to be "delegated." 2 Scor § 225.2.

But its right to operate through a broker or other person outside of its regular

corporate staff is no broader than that of an individual trustee. 2 Scorr § 171.4.
" See 2 ScoTT § 225.
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him to delegate, will be liable for a breach of trust committed by the
agent only when the trustee is personally at fault.160 Fault will of
course be imputed to the trustee if the act is committed at his direction,
or with his permission."6 ' He will also be deemed at fault if he is
negligent in the selection or retention of the agent,"" if he approves
or conceals the act of the agent, 1 3 if he fails to exercise adequate
supervision over the agent,' 4 or if he fails to take proper steps to
obtain redress.'
But in the absence of any of these circumstances,
the trustee is held blameless however grievous the fault of the agent.
The effect of authorizing a trustee to delegate acts of administration
is, therefore, to enable the liability of the agent to be substituted for
the liability of the trustee.
The soundness of the existing rule may be doubted. It was fair
enough, when trustees served without compensation, to require of them
only personal integrity. Today, when trustees are nearly always compensated, and the bulk of trust business is transacted by corporations
established to do it at a profit, it is hard to see why the trustee's duty
to the beneficiary should be less than its duty to outsiders. It is a great
deal harder, however, to see why the opportunity of the trustee to
escape liability should be extended. One thing almost certainly in the
mind of even an inexperienced settlor is that a trust company is financially responsible. He has less cause to make the same assumption
about brokers, attorneys, accountants or investment advisors to whom
it may resort for advice. In the Act lurks the further danger that
trustees may find it worthwhile to resort to outside advice in matters
which they now handle internally. And it is not hard to conceive modifications of corporate structure and business arrangements that would
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 225(2) (1959). It is perhaps inaccurate to
speak of the agent's act as a "breach of trust." In order for the trustee to be liable,
however, the act must be one which, if done by the trustee personally, would have been
a breach of trust. Ibid.
nIRESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 225, comment a (1959).
'C'Robinson
v. Harkin [1896] 2 Ch. 415; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
225, comment a (1959).
¢RESTATEMT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 225, comment a (1959) ; 2 SCOTTr § 225.1.
u McClure v. Middletown Trust Co., 95 Conn. 148, 110 Atl. 838 (1920) (attorney
failed to collect trust assets) ; In re Hartzell's Will, 43 Ill.
App. 2d 118, 192
N.E.2d 697 (1963) (attorney permitted to receive and retain purchase money on
sale of land). RESTATEMENT (SEcom), TRUSTS § 225, comment a (1959); Key v.
Hughes' Executors, 32 W. Va. 184, 9 S.E. 77 (1889)

(failure to see that bank

purchased securities as directed); Hopgood v. Parkin, L.R. 11 Eq. 74 (1870)
(solicitor failed to obtain proper abstract of title); Challen v. Shippam, 4 Hare
555, 67 Eng. Rep. 768 (Ch. 1845) (failure to see that banker made investments
as directed).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 225, comment a (1959) ; McCloskey v. Gleason, 56 Vt. 264, 48 Am. Rep. 770 (1883).
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make it easier for persons responsible for certain kinds of decisions to
qualify as outside assistants, and therefore, as legitimate delegates.
The potentially adverse effect of the Act is even more severe in
situations where, under present law, a trustee's liability is absolute.
A trustee, for example, will normally be held absolutely liable for
disbursing trust funds without authorization; 1 6 for example, where
through misconstruction of an ambiguous instrument, the trustee pays
principal or income to the wrong "beneficiary."' 7 He is liable even
if he acted in the utmost good faith,' and even though he acted
on competent legal advice. 6 9 This principle seems sound. The disposition of the beneficial interest is central to the administration of
the trust. In this vital matter, a trustee may protect itself by judicial
instructions, secured on hearing after notice to interested parties.
In case of the slightest doubt, nothing less should suffice: a beneficiary's rights should not be settled by speculation or "advice," however well intended.
Under the Act, however, the trustee would be relieved of liability,
provided that he acted on the advice of an attorney selected with
proper care.'
The danger is not remote or hypothetical. The annual
volume of litigation on the construction of wills and trusts is substantial. That the precision of testamentary draftsmanship is not
what it should be will surprise no trust officer or practicing attorney.
Questions of construction are of almost daily occurrence.
Under existing law, where these questions raise any substantial
doubts, any experienced attorney or trust officer will seek judicial
instructions. Under the Act, however, the trustee need only accept
advice of counsel and it will be exonerated.
It may be argued that the liability of the attorney will protect
the beneficiary. In cases where he is clearly negligent, he probably
"? Dodd v. Winship, 144 Mass. 461, 11 N.E. 588 (1887); Graf v. Seymour
State Bank, 221 Wis. 122, 266 N.W. 222 (1936); In re Windsor Steam Coal Co.,
[1929] 1 Ch. 151; 2 Scorr § 226.
1" National Trustee Co. of Australasia, Ltd. v. General Finance Co. of Australasia,
Ltd., [1905] A.C. 373, 381 (Vict.) (trustee liable for payment to children, on mistaken
belief that they were next of kin of life beneficiary) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood,
321 Mass. 519, 74 N.E.2d 141 (1947) (distribution to adopted child).
" Ellis v. Kelsey, 241 N.Y. 374, 150 N.E. 148 (1925) (trustee reasonably but
erroneously believed sister of a designated person, to whom money was paid, was
his heir).
"0National Trustee Co. of Australasia, Ltd. v. General Fin. Co. of Australasia,
Ltd, [19051 A.C. 373, 381 (Vict.).
'f0 Section 3(c) (24) blanketly permits the trustee to act on the recommendations
of attorneys, without independent investigation. The "prudent man" standard would
presumably require care in the selection of an attorney.
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will be held liable. 71' But in many cases, the attorney will have used
adequate skill but reached the wrong conclusion. 72 In these cases
the beneficiary would apparently be without redress.
It seems unwise to adopt a rule of law which would encourage
determination of the rights of beneficiaries by resorting to advice of
counsel, often informal and usually ex parte, in lieu of judicial instruction, delivered after a hearing at which all positions are represented. Beneficiaries of course should not so be disserved. Nor should
attorneys be put in the position of being called upon to assume responsibility for decisions of the kind involved, at the risk of being
thought over-meticulous if they suggest resort to judicial instructions.
Finally, in addition to enlarging the trustee's ability to delegate,
and thereby to escape liability for acts and decisions for which it
would otherwise be responsible, the Act appears to reduce the standards of conduct required of the trustee when it does delegate.
Under existing law, a trustee is required to exert proper supervision over his agent, 173 to discharge an incompetent agent 174 and to
seek prompt redress of any dereliction on the part of the agent.Y
Under the Act, however, the trustee is allowed "to act without independent investigation upon [the agent's recommendations]." It is
not clear just how far this provision is intended to relax the existing
rules, but it plainly does so to some extent.
Section 3 (c) (24) is believed to be unprecedented in any American
jurisdiction. It is closely patterned after the English Trust Act, 1925,
section 23 (1).17G That the dangers to which I have alluded are not fanciful is suggested by the interpretation of the English Act rendered by
77
Justice Mlaugham in In re Vickery: 1
It is hardly too much to say that it revolutionizes the position of a
trustee or an executor so far as regards the employment of agents.
1 It
is assumed, perhaps optimistically, that considerations of "privity" would
not be permitted to block the beneficiary's action against the attorney, especially
if no action were available against the trustee.
17 See National Trustee Co. of Australasia, Ltd. v. General Fin. Co. of Australasia,
Ltd., [1905] AC.373, 381 (Vict.).
"' See note 164 supra.
..See note 162 supra.
" See note 165 supra.
...
TRUST AcT 1925, § 23 (1) reads:
Trustees or personal representatives may, instead of acting personally, employ
and pay an agent, whether a solicitor, banker, stockbroker, or other person,
to transact any business or do any act required to be transacted or done in the
execution of the trust, or the administration of the testator's or intestate's
estate, including the receipt and payment of money, and shall be entitled to
be allowed and paid all charges and expenses so incurred, and shall not be
responsible for the default of any such agent if employed in good faith.
27 [1931] 1 Ch. 572, 581.
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He is no longer required to do any actual work himself, but he may
employ a solicitor or other agent to do it, whether there is any real
necessity for the employment or not. No doubt he should use his discretion in selecting an agent, and should employ him to do acts within
the scope of the usual business of the agent; but, as will be seen, a question arises whether even in these respects he is personally liable for a
loss due to the employment of the agent unless he has been guilty of
wilful default.
The English act has been criticized by Holdsworth as going too far
"in whittling away the liabilities of trustees, with the result that,
1
in some respects, the cestui que trust is insufficiently protected.'
Other commentators have suggested that the act is ambiguous and
requires redrafting,179 that the trustee should not be allowed to "ignore
with complacency the activities of his agent"'8 ° and that the act should
make it clear that the trustee cannot delegate discretionary powers,
or rid himself of the obligation to supervise an agent appointed under
the section.1 8 ' These criticisms and suggestions pertaining to the
English act seem generally applicable to its proposed American counterpart.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to point out the existence of
certain trends seen in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act toward relaxation of some of the existing rules of fiduciary responsibility, and
to uphold the continued need for those rules, in the light of certain
remarkably constant human failings which are believed to be unchanged by the conditions of contemporary trust practice.
Hard cases can always be found, and there are doubtless special
cases in which beneficiaries would be aided rather than hindered by
the provisions criticized. On balance, however, I believe that the
protection extended to the beneficiary's interest by existing rules far
outweighs the occasional disadvantage.
In cases where special circumstances suggest the desirability of
permitting specified self-dealing transactions, or otherwise easing the
normal obligations of the trustee, the settlor may readily grant the
necessary permission in the terms of the trust instrument. In the
cases where the trustee has an opportunity to review the instrument
Quoted in Sheridan, The Trustee Act, 1966, 4 SoL. Q. 186, 191 (1965).
192.
" Jones, Delegation by Trustees: A Reappraisal, 22 MODERN L. REV. 381,

"'

I''

Id. at

393 (1959).
" Sheridan, supra note 178, at 192-93.
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prior to execution (nearly always in the case of inter vivos trusts,
and probably in the majority of substantial testamentary trusts drafted
today) it may (and usually does) suggest language to deal with
any special situations that may have been overlooked by the settlor.
The trustee should not object to calling such situations to the attention
of the settlor. Common honesty requires no less.
In cases where the circumstance requiring special treatment could
not be foreseen, beneficiary consent can be obtained, and if this is
not feasible, court authorization can be sought and, if the need is
clear, will generally be granted.
The suggested procedures may occasionally be cumbersome, and
ill-suited to the solution of routine problems of administration. The
authorization of self-dealing, and the exculpation of a trustee from
liability for the defaults of its agents, however, do not ordinarily
serve any interest of the beneficiary, and are not desirable in routine
situations.
If it is suggested that the settlor may, by appropriate language,
negative any provision of the Act, the answer is simply that this
will seldom happen, since settlors are seldom aware of the significance
of administrative provisions plainly inscribed, and will hardly ever be
aware of the meaning of an intricate statute which they have never
seen. Their attorneys are not always attentive to the importance
of administrative positions and even if they were, might feel awkward
in submitting to a trustee a document expressly repealing powers
granted by law. Those who feel that the Act goes too far might be
tempted to insert in every trust a powers clause, judged satisfactory
to the needs of the trust, but beginning "The trustee shall have the
following powers and none other." The drafting of such a clause,
of course, would not be a simple matter. But more basically, legislation
which encourages such verbal fencing is not fulfilling its purpose.
The limited thesis of this article has prevented consideration of
the many worthwhile provisions of the Act, which are admirably
summarized in the recent article by Charles Horowitz, Esq., heretofore cited. Most of the benefits sought by the framers would not be
disturbed by amendments strengthening the standards of fiduciary
responsibility along lines heretofore suggested. It is hoped that any
opinion in general support of such modifications may be made known
to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and that general legislative acceptance of the Act will be withheld pending appropriate
revisions.

